4

MONOGRAPH SERIES

Japan's New Middle Eastern Policy

Possibility of a "Soft Power" policy towards the Middle East

Cemil Aydin

THE TOKYO FOUNDATION
東京財団

4

MONOGRAPH SERIES

Japan's New Middle Eastern Policy

Possibility of a "Soft Power" policy towards the Middle East

Cemil Aydin

RESEARCH DIVISION
of THE TOKYO FOUNDATION

As Japan's first totally private, nonprofit and completely independent think tank, the Research Division of The Tokyo Foundation is dedicated to a broad range of policy researches and to the presentation of qualified policy recommendations based on these studies.

We have engendered numerous innovative ideas to date. Ideas on ways to achieve a new Japanese society, and to help create a new global relationship. We also have been conducting these policy research activities, including international study exchange programs, in our effort to build multi-dimensionality into the Japanese policy making processes, as well.

Monograph Series, published with a financial support from the Nippon Foundation, is designed to promote and disseminate the results of these studies. It is our sincere hope that they will trigger a broad range of policy discussions which, in turn, should contribute to the broadening and the advancement of the Japanese policy studies.

This paper is written by Mr. Cemil Aydin as the final report of his study conducted from June through October, 1999, titled "The Historical Context of Japan — Middle East Relations and the Outlook for the Future." (The contents of this paper represent his own view and do not necessarily reflect that of the foundation.)

March, 2001 **Research Division of The Tokyo Foundation**

CONTENTS

Introduction

There is a worldwide consensus that Japan's political position in the international community does not match its economic status as the second largest economy in the world. The best example of this was seen in Japanese policy during the Gulf War, when the only thing Japan contributed to the international crisis was a huge check.

Despite a thirteen billion dollar contribution, the Japanese government was criticized by the US and EU for doing nothing significant to match its international responsibilities. Japanese public opinion was not satisfied with this financial attitude to international relations either. Since then, there has been an ongoing debate inside the country over how to define its international goals.

In this essay, I would like to contribute to this ongoing discussion by making suggestions related to Japanese policy towards the Middle East. In light of changes in the definition of national interest deriving from Japan's grand vision of becoming a "global civilian power," I will argue for a multi-dimensional soft power policy toward the Middle East.

I define soft power as the non-military or non-coercive power of a nation, such as its cultural and intellectual appeal, to influence the decisions and trends in other societies and regions. I will first underline that soft power is the only available means to exert Japanese influence in the international community, given the non-military and civilian status of Japan and the new realities of globalization.

Relating soft power with Japan's grand vision, defined as its long-term

purpose and mission in the international community, I will also elaborate how Japan's civil society contribution, namely its social capital, would shape the success of a soft power policy.

Then, having defined the role of a grand vision, soft power and social capital in the formation of a new era of Japanese global influence, I will finally suggest several policies as examples of a potential Japanese soft power policy towards the Middle East.

[Chapter I]

Historical Background of Japan's Middle Eastern Policy

In terms of diplomatic and economic importance for Japan, the Middle East ranks as the fourth most important region after the US, Europe and the Asia-Pacific. Japan's relationship with the Middle East is not as well established as its multidimensionally strong relationships with the US, East Asia and Southeast Asia, or with Europe.

Nevertheless, the Middle East has a highly strategic importance for Japan because of its oil reserves and market potential. Furthermore, to fulfill its new active international vision as a "global civilian power," Japan needs to strengthen its ties with secondarily significant foreign policy areas such as the Middle East, Latin America, Central Asia and Africa. For these reasons, Japan has been in the process of formulating a new long-term policy for these areas since the Cold War ended.

From the Middle Eastern perspective, Japan's distance from the region and its lack of historical contact has made Japan a relatively lesser known part of the world for Middle Eastern peoples. Japan does not have a place as important as Europe or the US in the Middle Eastern perception of the world and, in fact, Japan is seen as lacking the power to touch issues central to that region.

For example, nobody would ever think of Japan when talking about security or peace. On the other hand, in economic matters, is seen as a major power together with the US and Europe. In terms of cultural influence, Japan ranks very low in the region. Before the Second World War, it was Europe that had the greatest cultural influence, and attracted the largest number of students.

Now, the US holds this position, and has become a center of education for the elite of the region. However, Japan does offer certain advantages for a strong relationship with the Middle East. It does not have an imperial legacy in the region, and has generally been seen as a more neutral and positive outsider. Further, the idea of being an "Eastern" nation, with the same non-Western experience of catching up with the Western powers in order to respond to Western expansion and colonialism, creates a certain sympathetic bond between Middle Easterners and the Japanese.

If we look back at Japanese diplomacy towards the Middle East, on the overall balance sheet, Japanese policy makers have achieved most of their "narrowly defined national economic interests" by enjoying total security in oil supply and by benefiting from exports to the Middle East market. Earlier potential problems in the US-Japan alliance due to differing Middle Eastern policies, categorized as pro-Arab versus pro-Israeli, were once a concern, and the Japanese foreign ministry spent many difficult decision-making hours after the first oil crisis in 1973 trying to harmonize its Middle East approach with American pressures.

Today, with changing developments in the politics of the region, Japan no longer faces a dilemma in terms of its policies towards Arab countries, Israel and the US. Thus, in terms of realizing its business, trade and energy interests, Japanese policy towards the Middle East has shown an overall positive balance sheet in the last three decades.

Yet I consider these business, trade and energy interests "narrowly defined national economic interests," even if they are still relevant and important for foreign policy. Currently, Japan is not content with this narrow definition of national economic interest. Japan's self-image as a global civilian power necessitates an active interest in world peace and order beyond economic interest.

Furthermore, Japan has a very educated society that has humanitarian and

cultural interest in the rest of the world. No matter how much Japanese people criticize themselves for not being open enough and international enough, they are currently more open and international than they were in the 1980s.

Looking back from the end of the 1990s, compared to the international power of Japan during the first oil crisis in 1973, Japan now has a much different position in the world community as an affluent and educated society and as a giant economic power. This Japanese power and changing international environment has led to a debate inside Japan on a new definition of national purpose and interest. Japan's sense of power has increased its consciousness of responsibility toward international society.

Due to both external and internal pressures, Japanese policymakers can no longer be content with their previous definition of national interest, and they already expressing a desire to make Japan more pro-active and influential in the international community.

It should be underlined that the Japan's desire to have a more active role in international society does not simply derive from the need to complement its business interests and to respond to external pressures. Japanese civil society itself wants to have active leadership in global issues for humanitarian and moral concerns. Recently, Japan has been witnessing a surge in NPO and NGO activities, and many public opinion leaders advocate the necessity for a more dynamic civil society that can complement and sometimes check the power of bureaucracy and the business community.

Some Japanese NGOs are already very active in East Asia and Southeast Asia, and they are defining a new vision for Japanese society in the international community. This tendency should be reflected in Japanese involvement in the Middle East as well, as currently this aspect of the Japanese relationship with the Middle East is not very advanced.

Overall non-economic aspects of Japan's relationship with Middle Eastern

societies, and its moral and political influence in the stability of the region are very minimal. In short, although Japan has achieved its economic interests in the Middle East region, it is aiming to improve its current relationship with the region.

Before discussing a new definition of interest and purpose for Japan's foreign policy, it should be noted that even the traditional concept of economic interests requires a larger perspective and a more pro-active approach than hitherto existed.

For example, Japan should not avoid involvement in the political and social affairs of the Middle East if it wants to protect its long-term economic interest in this region. The whole Middle Eastern scene may seem too distant and complicated for a Japanese businessman or politician, and he or she may feel very lucky that Japan is far away from such a troubled region. But Japan must take a pro-active approach to this region's problems as a leading economic power that has stakes in the stability and peace of the Middle East.

One might argue that Japan's ally and the only superpower in the world, the US, is already taking care of the stability and security of the region for its own interests, and that Japan should not worry too much. However, in many cases, the US is asking Japan to participate in international efforts in the Middle East, usually in a subordinate position and mostly as a financial supporter of US programs.

Furthermore, in the case of the Middle East, the US is somehow a part of the problem itself, because of its ties to Israel, its arms exports to the regional powers, and sometimes its very arrogant approach to the region's problems. In that sense, the EU's or Japan's interference and cooperation become necessary to check US policies in the interest of all three economic power zones.

Easing political tensions in the region, and helping the process of democratization and stability with a long-term perspective, might end up

being more economical for Japan than the price to be paid after instabilities erupt. The expensive bill that Japan had to pay during the Gulf War by collecting extra taxes from Japanese citizens is a good reminder of the fact that detachment from Middle Eastern social and political problems does not erase Japan's global responsibility.

Beyond Japan's economic interest in the stability and welfare of people in the Middle East region, more and more Japanese individuals and groups are searching for ways to contribute to the world without first thinking about their economic interests.

Some of them are worried about human rights violations, others want to help raise the status of women, or alleviate the level of poverty, and some want to increase intellectual and cultural contacts in both directions. Their visions for a different type of role for Japanese individuals and groups in international society will affect Japan's relationship with the Middle East. From this new perspective, older definitions of national interest are being challenged by new civil society initiatives.

There is no consensus inside Japan on this new style of international activism in relation to the Japanese sense of purpose and Japan's vision of world order. Perhaps as a sophisticated society, Japan will never have a total consensus on this idea. Yet, currently, Japan is very different from the Japan of twenty years ago.

In order to understand what has changed, and how it will affect Japan's Middle Eastern policy, first, I will talk about changes in Japan's grand vision in this century in order to underline what Japanese society and social groups are now hoping to achieve in the global community.

Second, I will discuss Japan's existing soft power in order to evaluate its capacity to implement any grand vision it may choose for its role in the world. And third, I will try to elaborate on Japan's social capital in terms of

international leadership in order to see the possible contribution of Japanese civil society in the implementation of its vision and in the enlargement of its soft power.

In light of these concepts, I will discuss the possibility of a soft power policy in Japan's relationship with the Middle East.

[Chapter II]

Goals and Means in Japan's Foreign Policy toward the Middle East: Grand Vision, Soft Power and Social Capital

Grand Vision

In the post-Second World War period, Japan applied its "rich nation, strong army" vision of the post-Meiji era in a modified way, and focused on being a rich nation without the need and capability for a "strong army policy." Japanese leaders first wanted to create recovery, and then aimed to catch up with the advanced nations, especially the US, in terms of technology, industry and economy.

According to the "Yoshida Doctrine," (the name later given to the policies of Shigeru Yoshida), the reality of the peace constitution, and the absence of an army under the US security umbrella were welcomed as favorable conditions for rapid economic recovery without the need for spending money on defense and armament.

Both Japanese progressives and conservatives agreed with this arrangement, the former for a vision of creating a peace-loving and anti-nuclear nation, the latter for economic reasons. Since Japan did not have much power, it did not have the luxury of formulating any grand vision or purpose other than self-strengthening and attainment of wealth.

Within this postwar context, Japan developed a neo-mercantilist trade policy towards the Middle East in order to benefit from the cheap oil resources, without much concern for cultural and political relationships. Meanwhile, cheap Middle East oil became the main energy supply of Japanese economic development. Gradually, Japanese dependence on oil for its energy supplies increased, and consequently its dependence on Middle Eastern oil increased drastically, as well.

According to later historical accounts, until the mid-1970s, Japan behaved like an international trading firm rather than a nation-state, pursuing only its own commercial interests, avoiding involvement in international political affairs, and escaping from controversial issues in its foreign relations.

The Cold War international environment and Japan's pragmatic conservative leadership made this trading firm policy a great success. But, when Japan achieved its goal towards the end of the 1970s, some conservative politicians like Prime Ministers Masayoshi Ohira and Yasuhiro Nakasone proposed and formulated a much broader role and mission for Japan within the international community.

At that time, there were both domestic and international pressures to do so, but neo-conservative leaders merged these demands very effectively with Japan's national interest, and pushed Japan to a new mood of nationalist internationalism. Yasuhiro Nakasone's involvement in the Middle East in his long bureaucratic career is a good indication of his nationalist internationalism. One of the founders of the Japan-Arab Friendship Society in 1956, Nakasone developed and encouraged strong internationalist ties and a mission for Japan in the Middle East, and tried to show how that would benefit Japan's national interest.

The 1973 oil shock shook Japan's confidence in the trading firm approach to foreign policy and forced it to make political choices for the sake of mercantile interest. When Arab oil-producing countries declared that they would cut oil supply to countries that support Israel, or that do not oppose Israel on certain issues, Japan was also classified as a "non-friendly" state, and was subjected to oil suppl reduction.

This event not only altered Japan's Middle East policy but also convinced more and more Japanese that Japan had to have a more active cultural diplomacy so that it could change its image of "pure economic interest seekers" easily threatened by economic sanctions. In line with its national interest in

securing energy supplies, and at the expense of risking disagreement with American policy in the Middle East, the Japanese government made stronger pro-Palestinian pronouncements, and indicated that it would apply a partial economic boycott on Israel.

A little change in Japanese Middle Eastern policy was enough to avoid the initial shock of the oil boycott by earning a "friendly nation" status from the Arab oil producers. After this incident, for a long-term solution, Japan exerted more effort to make its relationship with the Middle East multi-dimensional so that it could have more influence on the region. It also improved cultural and intellectual dialogue and sought to gather more information about the Middle East region.

Strong support emerged for Middle Eastern Studies inside Japan to learn more about the region and its history so that Japan could understand the people who controlled its energy resources. Existing think tanks, such as the Middle East Institute of Japan, were strengthened and some new think tanks established.

For example, the Japan Cooperation Center for the Middle East was established in the year of the first oil crisis. In short, the policy changes made within the nationalist framework of securing energy for the creation of a rich nation required Japanese leaders to give Japan a more internationalist image in the Middle East. Student and cultural exchange programs were developed. The Japan Foundation organized several intellectual exchange conferences. Later, the Ministry of Education, JETRO and other agencies tried to strengthen human ties with the Middle Eastern region by more frequent intellectual and technical exchanges.

If these policy changes had not coincided with other big changes in Japan's status in the international community, Japan's traditionally detached Middle Eastern policy would have continued with few modifications, and that could have been enough for Japanese policy aims.

But, towards the 1980s, Japan experienced much greater changes in its status in the international community, and in the mid-1980s, it became the second largest economy in the world. This created the problem of finding the most appropriate international role and mission for Japan as a new "great power." New great power status naturally required a new style of Japanese foreign policy as well.

Thanks to its rapid economic progress and modernization, Japan proved to have become truly modern. Once it claimed its position as a member of the G-7 club, the other Asian countries, and even Western countries, looked to Japan for models and examples. However, initially Japan was hesitant to declare that it could act as a model for others. Japan's economic miracle happened in such a short period of time that it was difficult for Japanese society to harmonize its cultural attitude towards the world with its new economic power.

There was also a Japanese fear of making the same mistake of the prewar era if it tried to assume world power status. Nevertheless, the proof of Japanese success in the 1980s created a problem of a future vision because there was no longer an advanced superior West/US to imitate and to inspire domestic reforms.

Historically, the US had provided the concrete models and standards for institution-building for Japan during the postwar period, and in many areas Japan became so successful that finally the US recognized it as a partner, or even as a competitor and threat. This was a clear indication that the postwar project had been successful. But, it also meant that Japan was on its own, could no longer copy outside models, and needed to think of its own future goals.

Furthermore, it meant responsibility as a great economic power. Perhaps many Japanese wanted to become another Denmark or Sweden, an orderly and wealthy state with even income distribution, and without many international responsibilities. Nevertheless, Japan had become such a major

economic giant in the world markets that many others countries, particularly the US, began to pressure it for greater international contribution. Thus, in the end, even if Japan was not in a position to offer leadership in the intellectual sphere, it had to make more contributions to the international community.

The domestic debates on internationalization and the global society in the 1980s reflect this search for a new mission for Japan. Japan produced among the most extensive literature on internationalism. Although there are still many different opinions and sides in the debates on Japan's proper international role and mission, recently a certain consensus on basic principles is also emerging. Without going into the details of the internationalization debate, I would like to give an example from a mainstream opinion leader.

One of Japan's most well-known internationalists, and currently a member of Prime Minister Obuchi's "21st century policy preparation advisory committee," Yoichi Funabashi expresses the dominant opinions of the internationalist camp in his articles. He depicts Japan's new ideal identity and international mission after the Cold War as a "non-nuclear, non-weapon-exporting, economically dynamic, democratic and generous civilian power; in short, a prototype of a global civilian power." As a reflection of this grand vision, Funabashi tries to define Japan's international mission, and suggests strong support for development aid, UN peacekeeping operations, refugee relief, and public perception of Japanese society as stakeholders in a peaceful, orderly, international system.

As concrete implications of this vision and mission in the next decade, Funabashi hopes to see the emergence of new players, including younger and more internationalist politicians, women and non-governmental organizations, from Japanese society. For new ideas and human resources, he hopes that burgeoning civil society in the form of NGOs and think tanks can help Japan's bureaucrats and diplomats. [1]

[1]Yoichi Funabashi, "Tokyo's Depression Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs(November/December 1998).

A similar vision for Japan in the international community is becoming more accepted among intellectuals, and becoming more influential at the governmental level of thinking as well. If this trend continues, we may expect to see the implications of this vision at various levels of decision making. Recently, Japan's semi-governmental international cooperation institutions, such as the Japan Foundation, JICA, JETRO, the Ministry of Education, FASID, and JSPS, and many private foundations such as the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and Toyota Foundation, have policies that reflect this vision as well. It is natural that the Japanese approach to Middle East issues and societies will also be affected by this new vision.

Japan's relationship to East Asia and the ASEAN region has already been affected by Japan's new grand vision of itself as a global civilian power. Japan has developed a strong relationship with this region in a multidimensional way, with the growing participation of society in the form of NGOs, think tanks, educational and cultural exchange, tourist movements and philanthropic activities.

This is an example of how a grand vision motivates numerous actors within a society and at the governmental level. What might be expected is that Japan will extend its close ties with the US, Europe and the Asia-Pacific to other regions as well, although the first three areas will naturally remain the priorities. Compared to the prewar period, Japan's grand vision aims at a greater role and leadership in partnership with the US, not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but also in other parts of the world. We have yet to see more concrete results of this gradual change in Japan's grand vision, yet it will surely push Japan to new status in the international community.

To what extent and by which means can Japan fulfill its grand vision in the world? How can Japan's new grand vision of becoming a global civilian power influence its Middle East policy? Can Japan's influence in the world in terms of culture, education, ideas and institutional models match its great power status? These questions should be discussed in the context of its actual

soft power in the world in general, and in the Middle East in particular.

Soft Power

If grand vision defines the purpose and aims of a society, soft power indicates the capability and tools in the realization of these purposes, especially for a non-military power like Japan. Without intermediary soft power, the economic power of a nation cannot translate into influence in international society.

For instance, Norway has more international prestige and influence than Saudi Arabia, although their GNPs are comparable, because pure economic numbers do not indicate a high position in international society. Thus, there is a growing literature recently on the concept of soft power, usually described as a country's non-military or non-coercive power to influence the decisions and trends in other nations or regions.

Actually, this concept is mostly used to explain American power, and it is argued that even though the US has considerable military and economic power, its soft power is sometimes more influential and significant. As main factors that contribute to American soft power, the following items are usually mentioned: CNN and other international TV channels, foreign students in American universities, the cultural impact of Hollywood movies or American music, the popularity of American writers and intellectuals all over the world, the power of English-language media originating from the US, the large networks of relationships that American civil organizations have all over the world, US-origin international NGOs and foundations, and many other non-military and non-economic factors.

The appeal of the US's liberal internationalist ideology, and its way of life, should also be added to this list. During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union had a certain soft power competition in addition to their military and economic competition, and that competition ultimately made the US more powerful in terms of its soft power policies.

Some countries seem to have strong soft power policies. France, for example, has a vigorous policy of maintaining its soft power, particularly in former colonial domains, against the rising global power of the US. The French government has a comprehensive culture and education policy, such as its support of foreign students in France and French-origin international organizations. In terms of global soft power, perhaps the European Union as a whole, if unity progresses smoothly, could become the US's main competitor in the future. In addition, since soft power contributes to economic interest, governments include it in their calculation of national interest.

For example, France is still the largest trading partner for most of its former colonies in return for its soft power policy. The US is delighted with the power of Hollywood movies around the world, and at several points in history, has clearly supported it. Connections between CNN and the US government are another good example of interconnection between soft power and national interest.

The rise of the US in 20th century international society has to some extent been a result of its natural and human resources, but historians have emphasized how its grand vision and its belief in its right to lead affected the formation of US soft power after a certain point. US soft power increased a great deal as a corollary to "military power" during the Cold War in the competition with the Soviet Union, and later reinforced the US's status as the only superpower following its rival's collapse.

Since Japan cannot exert military power in international affairs, all it has is either economic power or soft power. It may be unfair to compare Japan with the US in terms of soft power, but compared to even the UK, France or Germany, Japan's soft power in the international community seems to be lower than its economic status in terms of GNP. Recently, there is a significant rise in Japan's soft power in East and Southeast Asia, if we look at the rise in the number of students studying Japanese language in these regions, or the rise in the influence of Japanese popular culture.

The Japanese government did have certain soft power policies in the past. For example, the Japanese Ministry of Education tried to launch an ambitious project to increase the number of foreign students in Japan in 1986. Initially, several measures succeeded in multiplying the number of foreign students fivefold from 10,000 in 1984 to over 50,000 in 1994, but there has not been any further increase since then. Furthermore, the ratio of students from outside the East Asian region, such as the Middle East, is extremely low.

Though the ambitious aim of having 100,000 foreign students in Japanese universities by the end of the century will be hard to achieve, policies in this regard are having some effect in terms of Japan's international influence in East and Southeast Asia. However, in general, Japanese soft power is much lower than that of the US and Europe, even in East and Southeast Asia. For example, Asian elites watch CNN and BBC, not NHK; they read Time and Newsweek, not AERA. Nor is Japan is their first choice for their children's higher education.

As far as the Middle East is concerned, during the first oil crisis, the Japanese side recognized the importance of the factor of soft power in its relationship with Arab countries, and tried to develop human contacts or intellectual and cultural interactions. One of the reasons OPEC was friendlier towards Europe during the first oil crisis than Japan certainly had something to do with European soft power in the Arab world. After all, the children of most Arab leaders were studying in European countries.

Realizing the importance of strengthening the non-economic aspects of its relationship with the Middle East then, over the last 25 years, Japan has established a student scholarship program, developed its Islamic and Middle Eastern studies, send hundreds of students to the region, organized numerous Japanese cultural weeks, and supported Japanese studies programs.

Although there has been great progress in this regard since 1973, Japan's cultural image, or its international charisma and soft power, remains far

behind its economic capacity and its identity as a global civilian economic power. Those Japanese advocates of a vision to become a real "global civilian power" want to increase Japan's moral leadership in the nuclear disarmament movement, on issues of cultural pluralism and racial equality, towards the environmental problem, and in humanitarian assistance all over the world, including the Middle East.

However, in case of the Middle East, recognition of Japanese moral leadership and cultural charisma remains insufficient to the Japanese aspiration to become a global civilian power. There is a sense of admiration for Japan's economic accomplishments and historical respect for Japan as the first non-Western nation to achieve complete modernization. People know the names of companies and brands like "Sony" and "Toyota" but, beyond that, there is no concept of the sophistication of Japanese intellectual life, its social and political debate, its leading academics and politicians, its famous actresses and actors, or its journalists.

In this respect, Japanese influence in the region is hardly any different from a medium size power's intellectual influence. This contrasts sharply with the fact that even the very "anti-American" groups in the Middle East might translate American authors such as Noam Chomsky, Ramsey Clark or Edward Said, or read or say something about Samuel Huntington's clash-of-civilization argument. Europe also continues to exert a considerable intellectual and cultural influence on the region, despite having lost its hegemony to America.

One can say that Japan has had a certain level of "silent" intellectual influence on Asia without any explicit cultural policy. For Japanese success in creating a peaceful and prosperous society after the war influenced the thinking of some leaders in Asia, such as Turkey's former President Turgut Ozal.

During the postwar period, while many Middle Eastern and Asian nations were busy with ideological conflicts and utopian ideals, Japan followed an "economy first and ideology second" approach in its domestic politics and

foreign policy. This was due to the unique circumstances of Japan after the American occupation, and perhaps other nations could not imitate it, but many were impressed by the potential success of the approach.

In that sense, in countries like Egypt and Turkey, there are many who think that their nations can also develop fast under American protection, like Japan did. Perhaps for the Middle East, a more important attribute of the Japanese model might be its small army and very low percentage of military spending in its GNP.

This aspect of Japan has also received attention, but due to the special circumstances of the Middle East, it seems a difficult policy to follow in the region. In short, Japan's soft power in the Middle East lags far behind the Japanese aspiration for "global civilian power" status in the international community.

The low level of Japanese soft power is especially seen in Japan's role and contribution in the Middle Eastern region. For example, recently not only have the US and Europe pushed Japan to get more involved in Middle Eastern affairs, but also some scholarly attempts were made to suggest possible Japanese contributions to the Middle East peace process.

In every case, Japan was asked to make a financial contribution, as if there was nothing else it could do. Since Japan is a non-military, giant economic power, it is partly understandable that many expect such a role. But, ideally, Japan could make its contribution through intellectual input and, more importantly, by offering an example to Middle East countries with its development model and peace constitution.

This may seem quite difficult to many, but if Japan intends to become a global civilian power, it needs to have certain intellectual and public opinion power to enter the debate on the future course of the international system and international principles.

Exerting an international influence through soft power is not something that the Japanese government can do through the agency of its bureaucrats. It requires a high level of social willingness, participation, and initiative in Japan for activities beyond Japanese borders. This raises the issue of the power of Japanese society; in other words, its level of social capital.

Social Capital

This concept is defined as features of social organizations that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action, both in the domestic politics and international politics of a nation.

Based on the experiences of Western democracies, social capital is associated with social connectedness, or civic engagement, which flourishes at the grassroots levels of society. A rich associational life and dense social networks bring social trust and a healthy democracy, and foster good domestic and international governance.

What is society's participation in Japan's international activities and in Japan's policy making? Is Japan a high social capital nation in terms of civil society involvement in foreign policy issues? Can public opinion on international issues easily organize itself in the form of international NGOs or civic pressure groups, and influence Japanese foreign policy?

It is usually argued that Japan does not have much social participation in foreign policy issues. Some explain this with cultural factors, and some attribute it to a legal mechanism that does not allow any easy formation of "public interest legal persons." This weakness of Japanese civil society associations has become problematic in recent times, with the global rise in international-issue-oriented NGOs (INGOs).

The INGOs' importance in international relations is gradually increasing, as can be seen in their success with the anti-land mine treaty and Jubilee 2000 movement. In connection with this, it is also usually observed that there are far

fewer international INGOs originating from Japan, compared to other major economic powers.

Even though there has been a gradual rise in Japan's social interest and involvement in East Asian and ASEAN countries, interest in the Middle East is still very minimal. For example, due to the lack of any domestic interest in Middle Eastern societies, it is observed that the Japanese government did not even have a Gulf War problem due to a lack of domestic pressure on the issue.

Rather, Japan had an American problem during the Gulf War, because the Japanese authorities formulated their policies towards the Gulf problem mostly under pressures from the American government as part of their relations with the US. Perhaps this claim is exaggerated, but historically the pressures of Japanese public opinion on the formulation of foreign policy regarding the Palestinian problem or Middle Eastern issues have not been very high.

The relationship between Japan's Middle East scholars, public opinion and actual foreign ministry policy makers is where we can test the richness of Japanese social capital. During the 1970s, intellectuals and scholars had a certain impact on the formulation of Middle East policy, aside from the Arabists in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MOFA), other bureaucrats and the business community.

This intellectual influence was not a product of think tanks, but was shaped by articles in Japanese journals and newspapers, or through the personal networks some Middle East scholars had with students in the ministry. In a way, intellectuals represented the pressures of civil society on Japanese bureaucrats. Because scholars and journalists in the Japan of the 1970s usually had a left-wing orientation, and were sensitive to the issues of imperialism, Asian nationalism, and American hegemony, the social pressure they exerted on the MOFA suggested a pro-Palestinian stance during the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Meanwhile, conservative intellectuals agreed with the left-wing intellectuals on the issue of the Middle East because they wanted to alter Japanese foreign policy by become more independent of US policy. Thus, during the 1970s, the pragmatic pro-Arab policies of Japanese bureaucrats were supported by the intellectuals of the time for different reasons.

In the 1990s, intellectuals and scholars are no longer the sole representatives of Japanese civil society due to the rise in associational life. Furthermore, there is no longer a dominant ideology among intellectuals. New actors and dynamics have appeared in Japanese society, and more people advocate a larger role for social participation, through independent research institutions, think tanks and NGOs, in policy making.

Tadashi Yamamoto and Takahiro Suzuki have written about the necessity of this change, mostly by indicating as models US research institutions and think tanks. However, especially compared to the US, the state of Japanese think tanks is hardly deemed satisfactory by advocates of a stronger civil society.

For example, Japan has several research institutions that deal with Middle East policies, but most of them were established and are funded by government ministries or Keidanren (The Federation of Economic Organizations). And, amazingly, they all experienced financial difficulties in the recent economic crisis.

There are both legal and financial obstacles for the emergence of more private independent think tanks in Japan. Think tanks on Middle East issues are no exception to this. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Keidanren, and big oil companies do have their research groups, and they do consult scholars, but there are no research institutions that do research on Middle East foreign policy issues under civil society initiative.

Even though the number of Japanese experts on the Middle East has

increased drastically, the institutional vehicles that can channel their knowledge and expertise to policy making efficiently have not developed as much as Japan's civil society and think tank advocates would like to see.

Currently, there are three major groups influencing Japanese Middle East foreign policy. The first involves the bureaucrats in MOFA and other government agencies such as MITI(Ministry of International Trade and Industry) or the Defense Agency. It seems that the experts in the Middle East section of MOFA favor a different policy than that advocated by the diplomats in the US section, because the latter have to consider the implications of any decision on US-Japan relations. The second group is the business community, and as far as the Middle East is concerned, their interests lie in the supply of oil and access to Middle East markets. Keidanren represents the interests of this community, and they usually see the region from the perspective of business interests.

Keidanren has its own semi-think tank association called the Japan Cooperation Center for the Middle East. Interestingly, the business community supported Japan's "pro-Arab" policy shift in 1973 based on the economic calculations of its business members, and again at the end of the 1980s, they pressured for a move to cancel the partial Arab boycott due to new economic considerations towards Israel and the US.

The third group is the community of scholars, intellectuals and experts on Middle East issues, the so-called non-governmental opinion makers. Government bureaucrats can benefit from their opinions, suggestions and research, but it is at the initiative of the bureaucrat to choose among the divergent policy proposals from the community of scholars. Japan's intellectual spectrum in the 1990s offers all kinds of colors and inclinations, and within the recently active civil society, there are several new NGOs focusing on the Middle Eastern problem.

Although Japanese society has the potential to put pressure on certain

policy making through either think tanks or NGO activism, currently such participation is minimal.

In light of the above discussion of Japan's grand vision, soft power and social capital, there are several effective soft power policies that would increase both Japanese interest and presence in the Middle Eastern region in the long term.

[Chapter III]

Policy Considerations

1) NGO and Aid Policy

Human Element in Japanese Aid: Japan has been criticized for just writing checks as a contribution to international efforts. Although this is not true for Japanese aid in East and Southeast Asia, it may be relevant to the Middle East.

Its Gulf War financial response is the best example of how a faceless contribution to an international effort is criticized by everybody, and appreciated by no one. In spite of its huge financial contribution to the Gulf War, both Europe and the US found it insufficient, and sadly even Kuwait did not thank Japan after the war.

Similarly, although Japanese ODA in the region is quite high, it goes to infrastructure projects, and does not involve much human interaction. Recently, Japan made some changes in its ODA policy so that it would not just give money, but also support Japanese NGO and civil society involvement. Furthermore, new ODA guidelines express the intention to pay more attention to the social impact of given aid, in terms of women's status, alleviation of poverty, or other social problems, in the countries receiving aid.

Japan has preferred to make its donations through UN commissions and agencies, but it is equally important to extend some part of its international aid through reliable Japanese NGOs. This will increase the chances for Japanese society to be directly involved in international and humanitarian activities, and will increase both the awareness and experience of the Japanese people with international problems. Aid to Palestinian refugees is a good example of this.

Recently, some Japanese NGOs, such as Paresuchina Kodomo no Kyampein (「パレスチナ子どものキャンペーン」 Palestinian Children's Campaign) and Nihon Paresuchina Iryou Kyokai (「日本パレスチナ医療協会」 Palestine Medical Treatment Association), are very active in this field, and they and other NGOs working in the Middle East deserve to be supported by Japanese ODA and other humanitarian agencies.

Positive Support for INGOs interested in the Middle East: With international NGOs the main channels for Japanese hope and vision in the world, there has recently been a surge in their number, supported by recent NPO legislation. However, there are still further moves Japanese NGO pressure groups are demanding from the government.

Japanese NGOs are very active especially in East and Southeast Asia, and have played a significant role in improving relations with Europe and the US. But in regions like Central Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and Africa, NGO involvement remains minimal due to a low level of public interest, historical ties, and media coverage. To balance this, the government should encourage international NGO activities in these secondary areas, including the Middle East.

Such affirmative support of NGOs through the government might seem contrary, since by definition non-governmental organizations should not be run by governmental policy. But this may be good way of creating initial interest for a transition period.

Expressing Opinion: Japan should not merely draw from financial power whenever seeking to make an international contribution. Just expressing what Japanese people think is right and wrong is as important as contributing financially.

Because Japan has proven itself as an able country of considerable social and intellectual potential, as well as through economic achievements admired

by the leaders of Asian countries, Japanese opinions in issues of economic development and social organization are highly respected. It is true that a certain kind of "Western supremacy" ideology has been instilled in the minds of many non-Western peoples, and thus they tend to take the opinions of Europeans and Americans more seriously than those of Asians or Africans.

But this can be changed in the long run, and Japan can contribute to the process. As for the values that Japan can tie to its foreign policy, or try to spread in the world, Japan's constitution specifies several, including peace, justice and sovereignty.

Moreover, as the only victim of nuclear weapons, Japan could even take the moral leadership in the field of nuclear disarmament, although, because it is currently under the protection of the US nuclear umbrella against China, such leadership would be more difficult to realize.

Nevertheless, Japan could campaign for arms control in the Middle East region by more effectively criticizing the US and European countries who profit a lot from arms sales to the Middle East. Furthermore, an agenda of democratization that is respectful of local cultures could be pursued and advocated by Japan as one of Asia's successful democracies. In addition, in expressing the opinions of Japanese society in the international arena, Japanese NGOs could be more successful than government bureaucrats, because governments always fear harming mutual relationships, and refrain from criticizing the non-democratic natures of other governments.

Yet Japanese NGOs confront a negative image of Japan in world politics. Japan does not have the image of neutrality as a peacemaker that Japanese groups would hope to have. For example, it would be difficult for Japan to play the kind of role that Norway played in the Middle East peace process. In fact, this is exactly the kind of role the Japanese people and leaders would like to take. But, to begin with, Japan does not have enough soft power to shoulder such a role through influence on others.

Secondly, Japan's image as a neo-mercantilist interest seeker interested in only economic benefits reduces its reliability as a neutral third power. Third, the Japanese MOFA is seen as under the control of American foreign policy and, in that sense, is not viewed as an autonomous subject in international affairs. Japanese civil groups have a different vision for Japan in the world, and it is their hope to change these impressions. International public opinion needs to be convinced that the Japanese wish to assume a greater international role is not necessarily based on economic interests. Civil society and NGO initiatives are good ways of demonstrating this point.

2) Education and Information Policy

Training Opportunities for the Young Japanese in International Organizations: One complaint I have heard numerous times from Japanese international civil society advocates involves the lack of interested, enthusiastic and relatively experienced young Japanese capable of representing Japanese society in the international arena.

Some people emphasize the problem of English ability as the cause. Though this is a significant factor, it is not the only reason. Scandinavian and French experience shows that the problem of language can be overcome. As a personal observation, after studying at the University of Tokyo for a year, I saw how few chances and opportunities exist for young students in Japan's best university to gain any experience in international organizations, especially compared to the opportunities and encouragement American universities provide.

In many American universities, students benefit greatly from paid summer internships in international organizations or in international NGOs supported by different philanthropic organizations. A summer long internship for a young student in Human Rights Watch, the UN or Doctors Without Borders increases the interest, enthusiasm and leadership capability of that person.

International Christian University has an excellent program like this, but few other Japanese universities do. It is clear that an early exposure of Japanese students to the world of international activism and leadership through such encouragement would not only make lots of idealist Japanese students happier, it would also add to Japan's international role in the future. In the case of Middle East policy, encouraging Japanese students to take summer internships in international organizations or NGOs or to deal with the region would greatly enhance knowledge and interest.

Area Studies and Think Tanks: Better intelligence gathering and coordination for all areas of the world, including the Middle East, is essential for a larger Japanese role in the world.

In 1973, when Japan had to deal with the political and cultural complexity of the Middle Eastern region, it also realized how weak its Middle Eastern area studies were. At that point, it was estimated that Japan lagged nearly 50 years behind the UK, and about 30 years behind the US, in terms of its scholarly community on Middle Eastern studies.

Many things have changed since then. With considerable government and private encouragement, today the Japanese Middle Eastern Studies Association, with annual congresses since 1984, has nearly 500 members. There are several centers for Middle Eastern area studies, and nearly all the big universities have faculty members teaching subjects related to the area. Currently, Japan ranks in the top five in terms of its contribution to scholarship on the Middle East.

This great progress in Middle Eastern studies cannot be explained merely by making reference to government encouragement or general social interest since the first oil crisis. It has a lot to do with the general educational level and academic sophistication in Japan as well.

To give an example, many scholars in Japan emphasized that Japanese

understanding of world history was very distorted due to an overemphasis on national, Chinese and European history. The rest of the world had been usually ignored in the earlier educational curriculums and in general world historical perceptions. Thus, Japanese intellectuals made an attempt to incorporate knowledge about Islamic history into this perception and understanding of world history to correct the previous Euro-centric or Sino-centric biases, with little concern for Japan's economic interest in the Middle East.

Currently, Japan has a sizable community of scholars and experts on Middle East studies, large library resources and publications in the Japanese language, and research networks. Naturally, different government agencies would like to benefit from this knowledge base in their policy formulations. In terms of information gathering on the Middle East, Japanese companies, MITI and MOFA already had strong information networks as well as affiliated think tanks, and they have benefited from the contributions of Japanese scholars.

However, due to the prewar experience of scholarly cooperation with the government, Japanese scholars are more sensitive about the issue of relations with government bureaucracies, and they are also very sensitive about their autonomy in research. Thus, they usually refrain from policy or contemporary studies.

Studies on the contemporary Middle East are not as popular as studies on the history of the Middle East. This may be partly due to the lack of Japanese subjectivity in influencing the modern Middle East, so there is not much need for an information base on contemporary politics and economics. Similarly, the amount and size of Japanese think tanks that specialize in policy issues regarding the Middle East are minimal because the participation of the Japanese government in international policy-making in the region is very low.

Japan is not like the US, which has numerous are varied think tanks specifically working on Middle East policy issues, with different agendas and perspectives. American society has a different social structure and interest in

politics, and has higher public interest in the events of the Middle East.

Yet, as a rising global power Japan also needs more foreign policy issue-oriented think tanks in cooperation with the scholarly world. This is a necessary component for Japan's larger international role in the Middle East.

As a step in this direction, some Japanese scholars are already talking about the possibility of a Contemporary Middle Eastern Studies Center to encourage studies in this field. With the current low level of Japanese social and private sector interest in the Middle East, the establishment of such a center would require government funding and support from taxpayer money, and would have to be justified with a national interest argument.

It seems that increased Japanese involvement in global issues and problems would constitute the national interest argument for this scholarly investment in contemporary Middle Eastern studies.

3) Reconsidering Japan's Cultural Policy

Intellectual/Cultural Exchange: Japan already has strong traditions of intellectual exchange with the US, Europe and East and Southeast Asia. Thus, based on this experience, Japan could extend its intellectual exchange and collaboration efforts to the Middle East, South America and Africa. In the latter three regions, Japan is already strongly involved in economic and cultural cooperation.

As far as the Middle East is concerned, there is only an Israel-Japan intellectual exchange program (launched in November 1993). Similar efforts could be thought of perhaps initially for Turkey, Iran and Egypt, and then extended to other countries. Next year (2000) is the UN's year for cultural dialogue, initially proposed by President Khatami of Iran. This was Khatami's response to the "clash of civilization" thesis that argues that Islamic and Western civilizations will have a conflict of values that will cause further conflicts in international relations.

Dialogue between Japan and Iran next year would be a good occasion to launch Japanese intellectual exchange efforts with the countries of the region. Up until now, intellectual exchange has involved only Japanese Middle Eastern studies scholars engaging the intellectuals in the region he or she studies. Such is merely the limited dialogue of area experts, who are usually not mainstream intellectuals in their own countries. The scope of such dialogue should be extended to the general opinion leaders and intellectuals in respective countries.

A multilateral version of this dialogue might be possible initially with Arabic-speaking countries, and then might include all countries in the region including Iran, Turkey and Israel. If achieved with an NGO initiative, this could facilitate an intellectual dialogue among regional centers, and could be Japan's contribution to regional stability and peace.

For example, a similar initiative by a Japanese think tank called the Toda Institute of Peace last year represented the first forum for the intellectuals of the hostile countries in the Gulf region to get together and exchange opinions. Most of these countries are unable to initiate this kind of effort themselves due to political animosities. It seems that sometimes outside powers may create better facilities for dialogue among the leaders of the Middle East.

Moving to the Next Stage of Cultural Introduction: The early phases of cultural dialogue usually involve promotion of goodwill among two societies or introducing one's own culture to other people to encourage the interest and understanding of others.

This kind of initial cultural promotion and introduction has been pursued by the Japan Foundation in many Middle Eastern countries to a certain extent. However, Japan has already passed this stage in two senses: First, initial emphasis on traditional culture like *kabuki* and *ikebana* has to be complemented by more modern cultural elements, such as modern movies, pop music, *manga*, animation, and scholarly trends.

Secondly, as a global power, Japan should discuss both global and regional issues during intellectual exchanges by going beyond the paradigm of introducing one's cultural traditions and understanding others's. There is already an awareness of global society and problems requiring international cooperation, such as the environment, human rights, and development.

Recently, Japanese cultural policy in East Asia moved from the introduction of Japanese culture to the level of discussing common regional and global problems. Middle Eastern cultural policy is ready for that stage as well. There is now a large Japanese culture center in Ankara and a new modern Japan Foundation office in Cairo. Perhaps in these places, the Japanese side will participate in debates on democracy, civil society, women's rights and sustainable development with their local partners, in addition to introducing contemporary and classical Japanese culture.

Conclusion:

Japan's new position in the international community as a global civilian power requires a more comprehensive Middle East policy that goes beyond the previous level of relationships defined by "narrowly defined economic interests" and basic cultural activities.

In this paper, it was argued that a new "soft power" policy would greatly enhance Japanese influence in the Middle East to the mutual advantage of both Middle Eastern societies and Japan.

To fulfill Japan's new grand vision in its relationship with the Middle East, there must be changes in Japan's relevant aid, culture and education policies to encourage more civil society participation and exchanges.

Japanese society potentially has a lot to contribute to the peace, democracy and prosperity of the Middle East region. A new Japanese policy should aim to actualize these potentialities.

Acknowledgement:

I would like to thank the following individuals for their time and contribution during my interviews with them. (Names are in alphabetical order.)

Tamotsu Aoki, *Professor, GRIPS, Tokyo*

Hisao Komatsu, *Professor, University of Tokyo, Director, Islamic Area Studies Project*

Shuji Hosaka, *Professor, Meiji University, Japan Middle East Institute*

Yuzo Itagaki, *Professor, Tokyo Keizai University*

Kunio Katakura, *Professor, Daito Bunka University, Former Ambassador to Egypt, Iraq and UAE*

Masatoshi Kohno, *Under-Secretary General, World Conference on Religion and Peace, Japanese Committee*

Yuriko Koike, *Member, House of Representatives, Japan*

Kimindo Kusaka, *Chairman, The Tokyo Foundation*

Hidehiro Minami, *Secretary General, Japan-Arab Association*

Hiroshi Mitani, *Professor, University of Tokyo*

Shohei Muta, *Senior Program Officer, JCIE, Tokyo*

Wataru Nishigahiro, *Deputy Director General for the Middle East, JETRO*

Koji Oku, *Deputy Director General, Information Service Department, JETRO*

Tadashi Omiya, *Executive Vice President, JETRO*

Takehiro Otsuka, *Professor, Himeji Dokkyo University*

Recep Ozkan, *Director, Turkey and Central Asia Culture Center, Tokyo*

Tsutomu Sakamoto, *Professor, Keio University*

Masaru Tamamoto, *Senior Consultant, World Policy Institute*

Masayuki Yamauchi, *Professor, University of Tokyo*

Selected Published References

"Advancing Common Purposes in the Broad Middle East, A Report to the Trilateral Commission: 52, 1998 Annual Meeting," published by the Trilateral Commission, New York, Paris and Tokyo, April 1998.

"Dialogue, Middle East and Japan: Symposium on Cultural Exchange," The Japan Foundation Conference Proceedings, November 1977.

Hironao Matsutani, *"Japonya'nın D. Politikası ve Türkiye,"* Ba lam Yayınları, Istanbul 1995.

Kaoru Sugihara and J. A. Allan, *"Japan in the Contemporary Middle East,"* A publication of the SOAS Japan Research Center and the SOAS Centre of Near and Middle Eastern Studies, Routledge, London 1993.

Kei Karasawa, *"Japan and Petroleum, the Most Critical Natural Resource,"* in *"Japan's Quest: The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect,"* edited by Warren S. Hunsberger and M. E. Sharpe, New York 1997.

Kunio Katakura and Motoka Katakura, *"Japan and the Middle East,"* The Middle East Institute of Japan, Tokyo 1991.

Micheal M. Yoshitsu, *"Caught in the Middle East: Japan's Diplomacy in Transition,"* Lexington Books, Lexington 1984.

Ronald A. Morse, ed., *"Japan and the Middle East in Alliance Politics, The Wilson Center: Asia Program/International Security Studies Program Conference Report,"* 1986.

Shigeki Koyama, *"Conditions in the Middle East Today and Japan's Economic Aid," in "Japan Review of International Affairs,"* Volume 7, No. 2, spring 1993.

Kazuo Takahashi, *"U.S.-Japan Relationship over the Persian Gulf, Islamic Area Studies Working Paper Series No. 8,"* Islamic Area Studies Project, Tokyo 1998.

"The Islamic World and Japan in Pursuit of Mutual Understanding," The Japan Foundation Conference Proceedings, October 1981, Tokyo.

Tsutomu Toichi, *"Middle Eastern Oil and Japan's Energy Security,"* in *"Japan Review of International Affairs,"* Volume 7, No. 2, Spring 1993.

William R. Nester, *"Japan and the Third World: Patterns, Power, Prospects,"* Macmillan, London 1992.

Yasumasa Kuroda, *"Japan in a New World Order: Contributing to the Arab-Israeli Peace Process,"* Nova Science Publishers, Inc., New York 1994.

Yoshiji Nogami, *"Japan's Middle East Policy in Transition,"* in *"Japan Review of International Affairs,"* Volume 7, No. 2, Spring 1993.

Author Profile

Cemil Aydin is a Ph.D. candidate at Harvard University, specializing on the influence of internationalist and nationalist thought on foreign policy in East Asia and the Middle East.

He is writing his dissertation on Pan-Asianist movement between 1905-1945 and the international links it facilitated between Japan and the larger Muslim World. Currently, he is also a Graduate Student Fellow at the Harvard University's Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. He has been teaching courses on the Middle Eastern Studies and Japanese Studies at Harvard as a teaching fellow and tutor.

His paper titled "Japan in the Nationalist Imagination of Egyptian and Turkish Intellectuals" was published in the Japanese language at the Conference Proceedings of "Atarashii Nihongaku no Kouchiku-1999(Newly structuring Japanology, 1999)" by Ochanomizu University. He was a visiting graduate student at the Tokyo University between April 1998 and September 1999. He has an MA degree in History from Istanbul University (1995), did Islamic Studies at the graduate level in Malaysia (1992), and completed his BA degree in Political Science and International Relations at Bosphorus University (Istanbul).

He wrote this report after he conducted his research at The Tokyo Foundation as a Visiting Research Fellow in June – August, 1999. He knows Arabic, Japanese and Turkish.

MONOGRAPH SERIES < 4 >

Japan's New Middle Eastern Policy

— Possibility of a "Soft Power" policy towards the Middle East —

March, 2001

Written by:
Cemil Aydin (Visiting Research Fellow)

Published by:
Research Division of The Tokyo Foundation
Hibiya Central Bldg.10th floor, 1-2-9 Nishi-Shinbashi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105-0003 Japan
TEL : 03-3502-9438 FAX : 03-3502-9439 URL : http://www.tkfd.or.jp

This publication is produced with a support from The Nippon Foundation.

RESEARCH DIVISION
of THE TOKYO FOUNDATION
Hibiya Central Bldg.10th fl., 1-2-9 Nishi-Shinbashi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105-0003
TEL:(03)3502-9438 FAX:(03)3502-9439 URL: http://www.tkfd.or.jp